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Abstract
We study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare, focusing
on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations. In a representative-agent model of
…scal federalism, fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax-setting author-
ities unambiguously reduces welfare. If, however, tax-setting authorities pursue revenue
maximization, fragmentation, by pushing down equilibrium tax rates, may under certain
conditions increase citizen welfare. We exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous
Swiss …scal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these e¤ects. While for purely
direct-democratic jurisdictions (which we associate with benevolent tax setting) we …nd
that tax rates increase in fragmentation, fragmentation has a moderating e¤ect on the tax
rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government. Our results thereby sup-
port the view that tax competition can be second-best welfare enhancing by constraining
the scope for public-sector revenue maximization.
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1 Introduction
Is tax competition good or bad for the wellbeing of society? This has been a question of
concern to federal states for as long as taxpayers have been free to settle in whatever part of
their country they pleased. And as lucrative tax bases are becoming ever more mobile across
national borders too, this issue is fast rising towards the top of the international policy agenda.
The main opposing arguments are straightforward. Advocates of tax harmonization think of
governments as essentially benevolent maximizers of social welfare, whose ability to o¤er the
optimum level of public goods is undermined by the erosion of their tax base. Conversely,
those who view tax competition as a force for good consider governments as self-interested
revenue maximizers, whose voracity may be constrained by tax competition. These are stock
arguments in debates concerning tax coordination, such as on the taxation of e-commerce
across US states, on harmonization of value added taxes and corporate taxes in the European
Union, or on the de…nition of “harmful tax competition” by the OECD.
Research in this area abounds.1 Economic theory provides elegant statements of the con-
ditions under which tax competition may be a force for good or a force for bad. Edwards
and Keen (1996), for example, show that the net welfare e¤ect of tax competition hinges on
the relative magnitude of two parameters: the marginal excess burden of taxation and the
government’s marginal ability to divert tax revenue for its own uses. Such parameters, how-
ever, elude precise measurement. Empirical work has therefore focused on indirect approaches,
based on observable variables. The most prominent strategy, initiated by Oates (1972, 1985),
is to study the relationship between government size and “decentralization”, where decen-
tralization is understood alternatively as the share of sub-federal government in consolidated
revenues or expenditure (centralism), or as the number of sub-federal governments (fragmen-
tation).2 This approach draws its working hypothesis from Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980)
description of governments as revenue-maximizing Leviathans, whose tax raising powers could
be held in check by decentralization. Negative partial correlations between government size
and decentralization were therefore interpreted as evidence in support of the Leviathan view,
and, implicitly at least, of the conjecture that tax competition is a force for good. It has come
1See Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for a comprehensive survey.
2 Important later contributions to this literature include Nelson (1987), Wallis and Oates (1988), Zax (1989)
and Forbes and Zampelli (1989). For a survey, see Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003).
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to be recognized, however, that this approach faces a major identi…cation problem, because
negative partial correlations between government size and decentralization are also predicted
by a model of horizontal tax competition among fully benevolent governments - in which case
tax competition is welfare reducing.3 Hence, regressing government size on decentralization
does not allow conjectures on underlying government objectives or on the welfare consequences
of tax competition. Recognizing the interpretational ambiguity besetting much of the existing
empirical literature, Epple and Nechyba (2004, p. 2463) note that “the work stimulated by
Oates addresses the issue of whether spending falls with increased competition, but does not
address the issue of whether resources are used more e¢ciently as competition increases”. Sim-
ilarly, Wilson and Wildasin (2004) conclude their survey with the observation that “more work
is needed to incorporate reasonable political processes into tax competition models, leading to
sharper empirical distinctions between good and bad tax competition”.
In this paper we seek to advance towards that aim through two main contributions. First,
we address the di¢culty of distinguishing good from bad tax competition in a way that is tied
rigorously to the theory. We derive a reduced-form relationship which involves only observable
variables and maps monotonically into welfare e¤ects, drawing on a model of …scal federalism in
the vein of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). In this model too, the di¤erence between welfare-
improving and welfare-reducing tax competition hinges on largely unobservable structural
parameters. However, we can establish the following simple prediction: if the relationship
between states’ “smallness” and the equilibrium state tax rate is positive for states that have
relatively benevolent governments, and if, other things equal, this same relationship turns
negative for states that have relatively less benevolent governments, then the latter e¤ect
can be interpreted as evidence of welfare-increasing “Leviathan taming”. The intuition is
straightforward. The smaller state , the less it internalizes the externalities created by its
tax decision on the tax base of other jurisdictions, both horizontally (i.e. for the other states
in the federation, whose tax base shrinks if state  lowers its tax rate) and vertically (i.e. for
the federal government, whose tax base increases if state  lowers its tax rate). Smallness
therefore exacerbates distortions created by externalities. Dominant horizontal externalities
lead to state taxes that are too low, while vertical externalities push towards state taxes that
3This has in fact …rst been pointed out by Oates (1985, footnote 2) himself, as he stated that “other sorts
of models besides Leviathan could produce such an outcome”.
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are too high. If smallness is positively correlated with state tax rates set by relatively benevolent
governments, this implies that the dominating externality pushes towards equilibrium state
taxes that are too high. If smallness is at the same time negatively correlated with tax rates
among Leviathan states, all else equal, this implies that smallness (i.e. tax competition) must
be a good thing for the citizens of those states, as it countervails both their governments’
intrinsic desire to overtax and the externalities pushing towards excessively high taxes.
An empirical evaluation of this prediction requires extraneous information on the benevo-
lence of government. Our second main contribution is to exploit an empirical setting that allows
us to distinguish a priori between government objectives across jurisdictions. We compile a
detailed new data set of local taxation in Switzerland, which o¤ers a propitious laboratory for
research on tax competition thanks to the exceptional institutional diversity and …scal auton-
omy of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. One feature of the Swiss data is that they allow us to
classify jurisdictions by the benevolence of their governments, where we associate benevolence
with the intensity of direct-democratic control in matters of local taxation. We thereby have
empirical measures for all the variables that appear in the theoretical prediction we wish to
test.
We estimate the impact of government benevolence on the relationship between local tax
rates and the relative smallness of jurisdictions, controlling for di¤erences in revenue needs,
locational attractiveness and systemic idiosyncrasies. A spatial GMM estimator is employed to
allow for unobserved spatial dependence. We …nd that, if they have benevolent governments,
relatively smaller jurisdictions set higher equilibrium tax rates, but that this relationship is
reversed in jurisdictions with greater scope for governmental revenue maximization. Hence, our
estimation results coincide with the theoretical prediction. Our empirical speci…cation allows
us to interpret this …nding as evidence that tax competition lowers equilibrium taxes because
governments are Leviathans, and the underlying theory identi…es this as evidence of bene…cial
tax competition. We thereby overcome the interpretational ambiguity of prior empirical work.
Our paper contributes to some additional issues raised in the literature. One recurrent
theme in empirical research following Oates (1985) concerns the appropriate de…nition of
“decentralization”, the metric for the intensity of tax competition. We plead in favor of the
fragmentation version: while, to the extent that governments are benevolent, relative sizes
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of federal and subfederal government budgets are endogenous, the number of jurisdictions,
and thus the relative size of a representative jurisdiction, can more plausibly be treated as
exogenous with respect to citizens’ …scal preferences.4 We therefore model the intensity of tax
competition via di¤erences in states’ smallness, in terms of their population shares, and we
treat the …scal share of the subfederal government level as an endogenous variable.
By allowing for …scal interdependencies not only among same-level governments but also
among di¤erent hierarchically nested government layers, our analysis furthermore takes ac-
count of the fact that the standard model of purely horizontal tax competition is increasingly
inappropriate as a framework for analyzing non-coordinated tax setting in many real-world
contexts. Both …scal decentralization from national to sub-national governments and (to an as
yet lesser extent) delegation of …scal competencies from national governments to supranational
institutions are evident global trends.5
The con…guration studied in this paper is therefore not speci…c to the Swiss case. In
general, vertical externalities are more likely to dominate the smaller is the sub-federal …scal
share. Average revenues of Swiss municipalities amount to some 70% of corresponding state
(“canton”) revenues, which is a relatively high sub-federal …scal share in international com-
parison.6 The scope for vertical externalities should therefore be rather higher in many other
federations. In addition, even the “Leviathan” governments in our Swiss data set are subject
to direct-democratic controls via voluntary referendums, which means that elected o¢cials
still enjoy comparatively little leeway to pursue their self-serving aims. Other nations’ sub-
federal jurisdictions likely exhibit greater scope both for vertical externalities and for revenue
maximization than Swiss municipalities, and hence our results should be relevant a fortiori to
other federal nations.
Finally, our study is related to a growing literature that seeks to establish how di¤erent
democratic institutions shape policy outcomes.7 The impact of direct democracy represents
4Fragmentation represents the standard approach for modelling the intensity of tax competition in theories
of …scal federalism and Leviathan governments (see, e.g., Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Keen and Kotsogiannis,
2003). We consider the possibility of endogenous jurisdictional smallness in our estimations.
5See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on …scal decentral-
ization.
6According to taxpolicycenter.org, 2005 US state tax revenue corresponded to 30% of federal tax revenue,
while the relative size of local tax revenue to state tax revenue ranged from 25% (Arkansas, Hawaii) to 111%
(Texas).
7This literature is surveyed comprehensively by Besley and Case (2003).
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one of the key themes in this research area. Gerber (1996) and Besley and Coate (2000) model
how the availability of direct-democratic instruments will push policy outcomes towards the
preferences of the median voter. Matsusaka (2005) o¤ers a survey of the relevant theoretical
and empirical literature and concludes that “direct democracy works”, precisely because it
mitigates agency problems between voters and potentially Leviathan governments.8 Our con-
tribution is to explore the e¤ect of direct democracy on local taxation via its interaction with
…scal externalities. This causal link has not, to our knowledge, been studied before.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model underlying
our analysis and presents the estimable predictions. In Section 3, we discuss our estimation
strategy and describe the empirical setting. Regression results are reported in Section 4, and
Section 5 o¤ers a concluding summary and discussion.
2 Theory
2.1 Leviathan taming in a …scal federation
The theoretical framework informing our estimation strategy is a “small open federation”
variant of the model developed by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). We allow for heterogeneous
government objectives and state sizes while retaining the assumptions that private agents hold
identical preferences and that there is a single mobile tax base. The details of the model
are presented in Appendix A. Here, we o¤er a verbal summary of its main features and of
the testable prediction used to identify welfare-improving Leviathan-taming tax competition
empirically.
We consider a federation with a central government and  …scally autonomous sub-federal
states . These states are alike in all respects bar their size and their governments’ preferences.
The single taxable production factor is perfectly mobile among states as well as between the
federation and the outside world. States share an identical production technology featuring
decreasing returns. Owners of the production factor consider returns on their factor from
within and from outside the federation as imperfect substitutes, which implies that equilibrium
8For a survey of empirical studies using US data, see Matsusaka (2004). Based on data for the Swiss
cantons, Feld and Matsusaka (2003) and Funk and Gathmann (2005) …nd that direct democracy acts as a
brake on public expenditure. Frey and Stutzer (2000) even report that, ceteris paribus, residents of more direct
democratic cantons are happier than those of cantons with more strongly delegated government.
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rates of return will be equalized among states but might di¤er between the federation and the
rest of the world.
The federal and state governments tax the production factor at rates  and  respectively.
Tax receipts are transformed into publicly provided goods, from which residents derive positive
utility. State governments can be (a) purely benevolent, in which case their objective function
coincides with citizens’ utility function, (b) pure Leviathans, in which case their only objective
is to maximize tax receipts, or (c) they can hold intermediate preferences, where the Leviathan
parameter  2 [0 1] represents the weight they attribute to revenue maximization.
Equilibrium state tax rates ¤ are suboptimal from the point of view of citizens except
for knife-edge con…gurations. Since all …scal externalities intensify as states get smaller, we
take the relative “smallness” of states (de…ned as one minus their population share in the
federation) as a metric for the intensity of tax competition. We can identify four e¤ects that
determine the equilibrium level of state tax rates relative to the social optimum  :
² a Leviathan e¤ect, which pushes up  for all state sizes (as higher  implies greater
government appetite for tax revenues),
² a horizontal tax externality, which pushes down  as states get smaller (the standard
“race to the bottom” e¤ect),
² a vertical tax externality, which pushes up  as states get smaller (as smaller states inter-
nalize to a lesser extent the positive externality they bestow upon the federal government
via low ), and
² a tax exporting e¤ect, which pushes  up or down depending on whether a particular
state is an importer or an exporter of the mobile factor (as the tax burden may or may
not be imposed on out-of-state residents).
It can be shown that, with purely benevolent governments, intensi…ed tax competition via
smaller state size will reduce welfare, irrespective of the dominant tax externality.9 However,
even the parsimonious model studied here does not allow for general analytical results on the
welfare implications of di¤erent state sizes. This re‡ects the di¢culty of linking (observable)
9This mirrors the result of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004). The formal proof of this result in our speci…c
setting can be provided on request.
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tax e¤ects of changing state size to (unobservable) welfare e¤ects, which in turn represents the
central intellectual challenge this paper seeks to address.
We can, however, identify a mapping from tax e¤ects of state sizes to welfare in one partic-
ular con…guration. Suppose we …nd that, for a given level of Leviathan government preferences
 , intensi…ed tax competition implied by smaller state size leads to higher equilibrium tax
rates. In that case tax competition is unambiguously welfare reducing. The logic of this result
is as follows. If equilibrium tax rates rise as states get smaller, this must mean that vertical
tax externalities dominate, as they are the only force pushing towards higher taxes as states
get smaller. This in turn implies suboptimally high state tax rates.
Now suppose that, for an otherwise comparable set of states with more strongly Leviathan
governments (higher ), we observe that smaller state size leads to lower equilibrium tax
rates: in this speci…c con…guration the model suggests that intensi…ed tax competition from
smaller state size is unambiguously welfare improving for the states with higher  . This is the
main result informing our empirics. It allows us to make welfare statements based on observed
relationships between tax rates, state sizes and government types.
How is it possible that the relationship between state size and the tax rate switches sign
as  changes? The intuition is as follows. The more Leviathan a state government, the
less it cares about federally …nanced public goods, as the federal funds are assumed to be
distributed equally to all citizens without transiting through state budgets. As a result, the
vertical externality loses force as  increases. In the limit, for a pure Leviathan state, the
existence of the upper-level government is irrelevant to the relationship between smallness and
chosen state tax rates. Hence, if the vertical externality is strong for a relatively benevolent
state government, leading taxes to rise in state smallness, the relative force of this externality
will be reduced if that state government becomes more Leviathan, such that the horizontal
externality may then dominate, leading equilibrium state taxes to fall in smallness.
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Figure 1: Smallness, Leviathan and equilibrium tax rates
The essence of our theoretical results is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the deviation of
equilibrium state tax rates from their optimum (¡ ) against di¤erent levels of smallness.10
When governments are purely benevolent ( = 0) and there is only one sub-federal state, the
state tax rate is optimal ( = 

 ). The interesting cases are where equilibrium tax rates fall
in smallness, because such a relationship has often been interpreted as evidence of Leviathan
taming. It turns out that taxes fall in smallness irrespective of government preferences in all
cases where horizontal externalities dominate. In those con…gurations, increasing smallness
(i.e. tax competition) can be a good or a bad thing, depending on whether  is above or
below  . Traditionally, regressions of government size on decentralization were (at least
implicitly) predicated on the assumption that  is above 

 , but this is not something that
can be ascertained empirically. Hence the usefulness of the case where equilibrium tax rates
rise in smallness for  up to a pivotal level ¤ , but fall in smallness for  above ¤ . In that
case, smallness (i.e. tax competition) is an unambiguous force for good for all   ¤ , as 
is monotonically lowered by increasing smallness towards  , but  never falls below 

 , i.e.
the equilibrium tax rate under dominant vertical externalities is never lower than the …rst-best
10Simulations suggest that the relationships depicted in Figure 1 are mostly convex with respect to smallness.
In addition, the crossing points of the  functions for di¤erent levels of  under dominant vertical externalities
may occur at di¤erent levels of smallness. We abstract from such details of functional form, the graph serving
a purely expositional purpose.
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tax rate  . In terms of Figure 1, © must not lie below the horizontal axis.11
2.2 Fragmentation
The key variable driving the intensity of tax externalities in our model is the relative small-
ness of states, whereas the related empirical literature uses two di¤erent exogenous variables,
fragmentation and centralism.
Our de…nition of smallness can be taken as a measure of fragmentation, because, from
the point of view of a representative state, a fragmented federation implies relatively small
states. The model clearly shows that observed inverse relationships between tax rates and
fragmentation are not su¢cient to infer Leviathan governments. However, it also o¤ers an
analytically rigorous version of the popular view that intensi…ed competition from increased
fragmentation can “tame the Leviathan”, provided that vertical externalities dominate when
state governments are relatively benevolent.
The empirical Leviathan literature has paid considerable attention to centralism, i.e. the
allocation of …scal powers between the federal and state government levels. This is represented
by the ratio of federal and state-level expenditures, which, with balanced budgets, is related
(albeit not necessarily equal) to the ratio of average tax rates  . The parameters that
determine the equilibrium state tax rate and the equilibrium federal tax rate will also determine
the ratio  . This means that equilibrium level of centralism depends in part on citizens’ …scal
preferences. Unlike fragmentation, the degree of centralism should not therefore be considered
as an exogenous determinant of the intensity of tax competition.12
What about the exogeneity of smallness? Jurisdictional de…nitions may be endogenous with
respect to taxation in certain settings (Perroni and Scharf, 2001), especially in the context of
single-purpose districts (Hoxby, 2000). Our analysis is based on general-purpose jurisdictions
with historically predetermined boundaries, such that jurisdictions’ size in geographic terms
can reasonably be taken as exogenous. Smallness in population terms, however, may in reality
be to some extent in‡uenced by tax rates. We return to this issue in the empirical part.
11Proposition 2 of Appendix A, supported by extensive simulations summarized in Appendix B, states that
this condition holds.
12See also Wilson and Janeba (2005), who study how the choice of  may be used strategically by the central
government to minimize the distortions arising from the interplay of horizontal and vertical tax externalities.
Note that, notwithstanding our assumption (spelt out in Appendix A) that  is independent of the distribution
of investor-…rms across states,  is likely to be in‡uenced by .
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3 Empirical setting
3.1 The regression model
The model of …scal federalism described above implies:13
 =     t¡ jX  (1)
where  denotes di¤erent federations,  represents smallness, and X represents state-
level and federation-level idiosyncrasies in revenue needs and tax-base elasticities.
A negative relationship between state tax rates and smallness could re‡ect (a) the domi-
nance of horizontal externalities and relatively benevolent governments, or (b) the presence of
Leviathan state governments. According to the theory, a positive relationship would in turn
point unambiguously to dominant vertical externalities.
If underlying state government objectives () are measurable, the natural empirical spec-
i…cation becomes:
 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3  ¤  + 4 + ¡ + X± +  (2)
where  again indexes states, ¡ is a weighted average of neighboring state tax rates, and
 is a stochastic disturbance.
The estimated coe¢cient 1 represents the (inverse of the) tax e¤ect of size for relatively
benevolent governments ( =  = 0).14 If 1  0, vertical externalities dominate at , and
Proposition 1 applies. The coe¢cient 3 then quanti…es the di¤erential e¤ect of smallness on
state tax rates for “relatively Leviathan” governments ( =   0). This will be our main
coe¢cient of interest.
According to the model (Appendix A, Proposition 2), if 1  0, 3  0, and 1 + 3  0,
we can infer that tax competition tames the Leviathan and increases social welfare. We call
this “strong Leviathan taming”: sti¤er tax competition from increased smallness improves
welfare in Leviathan states. Another possible parameter con…guration is 1  0, 3  0, but
1+3 ¸ 0. We refer to this as “weak Leviathan taming”. In this case, sti¤er tax competition
13Speci…cally, see equations (7) and (11) in Appendix A.
14For our empirical purposes, we treat  as a dummy variable, setting the lower-bound value  equal to zero.
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from increased smallness is less harmful in Leviathan states than in relatively benevolent states.
Some additional issues:
² Estimation of (2) requires variation in  and in  (). This is most likely to be
found in a comparison of multiple federations, which ideally should be similar to each
other in all other relevant respects.
² The theoretical model assumes states to be identical except for their size. Empirical
estimation needs to control for relevant asymmetries across states, such as revenue needs,
preferences for public goods, tax base elasticities and locational advantages. Hence,
state-level control variables X are included in (2).
² The reduced-form con…guration we seek to take to the data is independent of the way the
federal tax rate is set.15 However, the federal tax rate  is unlikely to be independent
from state tax rates - be it via strategic interactions between the two governments levels,
or through state- and federation-speci…c exogenous features that drive both  and  .
Likewise,  and ¡ will be interdependent. Such interdependence could for instance
be the result of yardstick competition, whereby citizens of a jurisdiction inform their
choices by observing tax decision in surrounding jurisdictions. We will address this issue
by instrumenting  and ¡.
²  could be spatially correlated in a way that is not explained by the model, i.e. via
spatial dependence among . We therefore use the spatial GMM estimator proposed
by Conley (1999), which applies a distance weighting up to some bound to the o¤-
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix while allowing us to keep instrumenting the
endogenous regressors.16
² We consider the inclusion of federations’ centralization ratios as an additional control
variable, by way of a robustness check and for comparability with the relevant empirical
literature (but without being warranted by the theory). Centralization is measured as
15Note that the vertical externalities considered in our model are of the “bottom-up” type: …scal choices of
sub-federal states are a¤ected by the existence of a federal layer, irrespective of the strategic interaction between
governements at di¤erent hierarchical levels.
16We choose a distance bound of 15 km. Sensitivity tests show the value of this bound to be unimportant
for our qualitative results.
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the ratio of state revenues to consolidated (state + federal) revenues. In view of the
evident endogeneity issue, we instrument this variable.
² We express all non-dichotomous variables in natural logs, so that the estimated coe¢-
cients can be interpreted as elasticities.
3.2 Switzerland: a laboratory for research on tax competition
Although the reduced-form predictions we seek to put to the test could conceivably also be
estimated on data for other federal systems, Switzerland presents a particularly propitious
empirical setting. The Swiss …scal constitution distinguishes three largely autonomous juris-
dictional layers (national, cantonal and municipal). Each jurisdictional layer collects a roughly
equal share of total tax revenues.17 We will concentrate on the cantonal and municipal levels.
Direct taxation at both these levels of government encompasses four conventional tax bases:
personal income and wealth, and corporate income and capital.18 Personal income is by far
the most important tax base, accounting for over 70% of municipal and over 60% of cantonal
tax revenues. Summary statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2.
Several institutional features make Switzerland particularly well suited to our study:
² Multiple federations: The three-tier …scal constitution implies that Switzerland can be
considered as a federation of federations. We will take cantons to represent the federa-
tions () of our empirical model, while municipalities represent the states ( ). Switzer-
land is divided into 26 cantons, which in turn contain between 3 (Basel Stadt) and 404
(Berne) municipalities.19
² Di¤erent degrees of direct democracy : There is substantial variation across municipalities
and cantons in the intensity of direct democratic involvement in the tax setting process.
The institutional settings used can be classi…ed in three categories: “assembly” munic-
ipalities that set taxes via show of hands at town hall meetings of the entire citizenry;
“referendum” municipalities whose constitutions feature compulsory referenda on …scal
17Over our sample period 1985-2001, revenue shares have remained fairly constant at some 30, 40 and 30
percent for the national, cantonal and municipal government levels, respectively (Feld et al., 2003).
18 In contrast to many other countries, property taxation is small even at the local level.
19These numbers refer to 1995. The total number of municipalities is in slow decline, as micro-municipalities
(some with populations below 100) are encouraged to merge. Since our sample includes 131 relatively large
municipalities, such changes do not a¤ect our data.
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decisions above certain thresholds; and a residual “Leviathan” category of municipali-
ties where …scal matters are largely under the control of elected executives. The basic
assumption is that municipalities with more direct democratic participation in the tax
setting process are more likely to behave benevolently, whereas more indirect democratic
control enhances the scope for Leviathan governments.20
² Overlapping tax bases: Tax bases are identical within each canton, since they are de-
termined by the cantonal tax law. Moreover, even across cantons, tax bases are very
similar, as the information to determine the national tax base is drawn from tax forms
used to report to the cantonal authorities.
² Fiscal autonomy : In spite of considerable harmonization of tax bases across cantons,
cantonal authorities enjoy full autonomy in choosing tax rates. Most cantons use the
following procedure to set taxes. The cantonal tax law determines a tax schedule on
the four tax bases. This schedule determines the level and progressivity of each tax
instrument. The cantonal authorities annually decide on a multiplier that shifts the
base tax schedule, determining the e¤ectively applied cantonal tax. Most cantons …x a
single multiplier across all tax bases. Similarly, most municipalities annually set a single
multiplier, which, applied to the cantonal tax schedule, determines the e¤ectively applied
municipal tax. This particular procedure implies that cantonal and municipal authorities
concentrate their decisions on tax bases with the highest impact on tax revenue (i.e.
personal income taxes). Re‡ecting the high degree of cantonal and municipal tax setting
autonomy, tax rates and schedules vary substantially across cantons and municipalities.
For example, the highest municipal income tax rate recorded in our database exceeds the
lowest one by a factor of …ve, for a given level of income (see also the standard deviations
reported in Table 2).
² Small transfers: Although vertical and horizontal …scal transfers do exist in Switzerland,
they are small. According to national statistics, net average vertical transfers represent
less than 2 percent, and net horizontal transfers less than 4 percent, of total municipal
20The proposition that direct democracy mitigates agency problems and aligns policy outcomes more closely
with citizen preferences is strongly supported by Matsusaka (2005), based on an extensive analysis of US data.
Gerber (1996) and Besley and Coate (2000) have modelled this link formally, while Feld and Matsusaka (2003)
and Funk and Gathmann (2005) provide relevant empirical support based on Swiss data.
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revenue.
3.3 Data
We have collected a panel data set of municipal and cantonal tax rates and control variables
for the years 1985, 1991, 1995, 1998 and 2001. The dataset covers up to 131 municipalities.
The information underlying our categorization of municipalities by degree of direct democ-
racy in …scal matters is taken from a survey conducted in the mid-1990s.21 We employ two
alternative dummy variables, that we denote by : in the assembly de…nition, the dummy vari-
able is set to 0 for all assembly municipalities, and to 1 for Leviathan (i.e. non-assembly and
non-referendum) municipalities; while in the referendum de…nition, the dummy variable is set
to 0 for all assembly or referendum municipalities, and to 1 for the Leviathan municipalities. 38
sample municipalities are attributed to the assembly category, while the referendum category
comprises 75 municipalities.  exhibits useful variance, as it di¤ers among many same-canton
municipalities as well as between cantons: while the total sample standard deviation of  is
0.49 (Table 1), the within-canton standard deviation still amounts to 0.30.
Since  features as a regressor in our empirical model, it is implicitly assumed to be an
exogenous feature. As pointed out e.g. by Besley and Case (2003), institutions are ultimately
endogenous too.  could depend on, or be simultaneously determined with,  in two evident
ways. On the one hand, local communities might push for more direct democracy if delegated
governments chronically overspend, in which case high (lagged)  is associated with low . On
the other hand, the predominantly conservative mentality of certain local electorates could
simultaneously induce lower  and a lower . One way to address this issue would be to
draw on intertemporal changes in decision-making institutions, and to control for lagged and
time-invariant location speci…c e¤ects. Democratic institutions, however, have a habit of being
highly persistent. No changes in the decision-making systems of our sample municipalities had
occurred at least up to 2000 (Micotti and Bützer, 2003). Additional evidence on the stability
over time of direct democratic institutions in Swiss cantons is provided by Feld and Matsusaka
(2003). The durability of the institutional structure to some extent mitigates concerns about
endogeneity. Moreover, the controls in our regression models capture the main fault lines in
21We are very grateful to Lars Feld for the generous provision of these data.
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Swiss political culture (di¤erent language groups, young versus old voters, rural versus urban
regions, and low-lying versus mountain regions).22
Since most municipalities set a single multiplier on the cantonal tax schedule, our main
focus is on a revenue-weighted average of standardized versions of a representative set of
e¤ective tax rates. We call this aggregate the “tax index”. Both municipal and cantonal tax
indices have mean zero by construction. Speci…cally, the tax index is constructed as the revenue
weighted mean of e¤ective average tax rates for nine representative tax payers, covering both
personal income and wealth and corporate income and capital.23
The smallness of a municipality is de…ned relative to its canton as  = 1¡  , where 
is the population of municipality  in canton , and  is the respective cantonal population.
For the population measures, we consider only residents with Swiss citizenship, since what we
seek to represent is municipalities’ political weight in the canton.
A range of control variables are included in all estimated equations (see Table 1 for summary
statistics).
² Theory suggests that we should control for the respective cantonal tax rates, the equiv-
alent of  . In addition, we control for the spatially weighted tax rates of other munic-
ipalities, ¡ , so as to capture direct strategic interactions among municipalities. ¡
is constructed as the average tax index of all municipalities excluding , weighted by
the inverse of the square of their euclidean distance from .24 Both these variables are
instrumented via two-stage least squares with three identifying canton-level variables,
the canton population living in urban areas, cantonal area and the canton’s number of
municipalities. The instrument sets furthermore include spatially weighted averages of
all exogenous municipality-level variables.
² Further controls are warranted to allow for di¤erences in municipalities’ public revenue
22Feld and Matsusaka (2003), in regressions at canton level, furthermore control for the parliamentary strength
of left-wing parties, to control for “ideology”; and they instrument . Neither of these extensions a¤ects their
results in any substantial way.
23We used ANOVA to characterize the levels and shapes of tax schedules with a parsimonious set of repre-
sentative tax payers. Three representative cases were identi…ed to describe tax schedules on personal income,
two cases were identi…ed for wealth taxes, three cases were identi…ed for corporate income taxes, and one case
was identi…ed for capital taxes. See Brülhart and Jametti (2006) for further details.
24Application of linear spatial weights changes none of our qualitative …ndings. We prefer square weights
given previous …ndings on spatial decay functions based on intra-national migration (e.g. Schwartz, 1973) and
commuting (e.g. Harsman and Quigley, 1998). Note that these control variables may also capture horizontal
tax-competition e¤ects that transgress canton borders.
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needs. We include regressors measuring municipal population, the share of population
under 20, the share of population over 65, municipal area, and a dummy for municipalities
that represent urban centers. Municipal area captures two e¤ects: it implies revenue
needs for transport and communication services, and it is strongly positively correlated
with the mountainousness of municipalities.
² Variables are added to control for di¤erences in municipalities’ locational attractiveness,
and thus their inherent appeal to potential tax payers: distance to the nearest freeway,
distance to the nearest international airport, and length of lake shore within the munici-
pality.
² A dummy for the Latin (i.e. French and Italian speaking) cantons controls attitudinal
di¤erences between those cantons and the German speaking majority.
² Although most municipalities enjoy complete autonomy in setting their tax rates, there
are some exceptions. Five of the 26 cantons have harmonized municipal tax rates on
corporate income and capital, whilst leaving municipalities’ freedom to set personal taxes
unconstrained. We therefore include a dummy that equals one for the relevant cantons
and taxes.25
4 Results
4.1 Baseline regressions
Our baseline spatial GMM estimation results of the empirical model (2) are shown in Table
3, separately for the referendum de…nition and for the assembly de…nition of . In order to
facilitate the comparison of e¤ect sizes, we also report standardized (beta) coe¢cients. The
diagnostic tests for overidentifying restrictions and weak instruments, reported in the last three
rows of Table 3, are satisfactory.
We …rst concentrate on the results based on the referendum de…nition (…rst results column
25We deliberately do not include canton …xed e¤ects, since such …xed e¤ects would pick up most of the vari-
ability in  and thus introduce endogeneity bias. However, some institutional idiosyncracies require additional
controls. We include a dummy for the canton of Geneva, which features joint taxation and a special revenue
sharing arrangement between cantonal and municipal authorities; and for the canton of Basel-Land, which
places restrictions on municipal tax autonomy.
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of Table 3), which encompasses our full data set. The model performs well. All statistically
signi…cant coe¢cients on the control variables conform with expectations: urban centers and
remote municipalities (measured by distance to the nearest airport) have relatively high taxes;
while municipalities with long lake shores and those located in the Latin regions have rel-
atively low taxes.26 The positive coe¢cient on spatially weighted tax rates of surrounding
municipalities suggests that tax rates are strategic complements, consistent with our theoret-
ical assumption.
Our main parameters of interest are those represented in the …rst three rows of the table.
We …nd the main e¤ect of smallness to be positive (although not statistically signi…cant).
This is consistent with the scenario underlying Propositions 1 and 2: for relatively benevolent
municipalities ( = 0), vertical externalities dominate (   0).
27
Our estimation also con…rms that direct-democratic …scal powers represent a valid proxy
variable for revenue maximization: the coe¢cient on the Leviathan dummy () is statistically
signi…cantly positive. This means that at the point where smallness is zero, i.e. where intra-
cantonal tax competition cannot exist, less direct-democratic municipalities have signi…cantly
higher average tax rates than more direct-democratic ones. The size of this e¤ect is consid-
erable, as it implies that, without intra-cantonal tax competition, Leviathan municipalities’
average tax rate is 45 percent (= 037 ¡ 1) higher than that of otherwise identical benevolent
municipalities.28
Our third and most important empirical result is that we …nd a negative coe¢cient on the
interaction variable between  and smallness. Hence, greater scope for Leviathan government
reduces the tax-raising e¤ect of smallness. Stated in reverse: fragmentation, while yielding
ine¢ciently high equilibrium tax rates for benevolent municipalities, acts as a counterweight
to the desire for high taxes on the part of Leviathan municipalities. The coe¢cient on the
26While consolidated (municipal plus cantonal) tax rates are generally higher in the Latin cantons, municipal
taxes tend to be lower, re‡ecting a higher degree of centralism in those cantons.
27The negative coe¢cient on the harmonized-tax dummy provides additional evidence for the existence of
vertical externalities: canton-wide tax harmonization drives municipal tax rates down rather than up.
28Looking at raw means in the full data set (Table 1), we observe that Leviathan municipalities, have slightly
lower average tax rates than benevolent municipalities. This may seem paradoxical, but it is of course entirely
consistent with a model where di¤erences in tax levels are determined also by di¤erent exogenous revenue needs
and interdependencies among jurisdictions. Inference should therefore be based on an empirical model that
controls for relevant covariates. Our result is consistent with corresponding …ndings made elsewhere. Evidence
that direct democracy reduces canton-level expenditure in Switzerland is provided by Feld and Matsusaka
(2003) and Funk and Gathmann (2005), and comparable evidence for the US is surveyed by Matsusaka (2004).
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interaction between  and smallness being larger in absolute value than the coe¢cient on
smallness suggests the presence of what we have termed “strong Leviathan taming”, which in
turn implies that fragmentation is (second-best) welfare improving in so far as the Leviathan
municipalities are concerned. In a statistical sense based on a Wald test of 1 + 3 = 0,
however, we cannot reject the null that Leviathan taming is merely of the “weak” form:
sti¤er tax competition induced by increased smallness is at least less harmful for Leviathan
municipalities than for benevolent municipalities.
The second data column of Table 3 displays results for regressions with the narrower
de…nition of “benevolence”, where  is set to zero only for municipalities that make …scal
decision via a vote by an assembly of the entire citizenry, and municipalities with intermediate
(i.e. referendum based) systems are left out. We observe that this changes our main results in
the expected way. The coe¢cient on smallness increases by a factor of more than three and
becomes statistically signi…cant. The main e¤ect of the Leviathan dummy is again statistically
signi…cantly positive, and its magnitude is considerably larger, which is in line with the starker
di¤erence between  = 0 and  = 1 under the assembly de…nition. The estimated coe¢cient
implies that a municipality which faces no intra-cantonal tax competition will raise its tax
rate by fully 148 percent (= 091 ¡ 1) if it switches from a system based on compulsory
…scal referenda to a system with delegated …scal authority. Our main interest again concerns
the slope-shifting e¤ect of . This coe¢cient increases by a factor of 2.4 (from -2.95 to -
7.19), and it remains statistically signi…cantly negative. The interaction e¤ect also remains
larger in absolute terms than the main e¤ect of smallness, which is consistent with strong
Leviathan taming, although this di¤erence again is not statistically signi…cant. The results
obtained for the assembly de…nition con…rm those found in the larger data set underlying
the referendum de…nition, and they are somewhat crisper still. This is in line both with
our mapping of decision-making systems to  and with the predictions of the theory, as the
institutional distance between  = 0 and  = 1 is larger with the assembly de…nition than
with the referendum de…nition.
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4.2 Extensions
We consider a number of extension to the benchmark estimations of Table 3, concentrating on
the full data sample based on the referendum de…nition.
First, we consider a number of alternative speci…cations using spatial GMM. One might
reasonably suspect reverse causality to a¤ect smallness, if population ‡ows were su¢ciently
sensitive to tax di¤erentials that in practice smallness were to a signi…cant extent determined
by tax burdens. We address this issue alternatively by replacing the population-based measure
of smallness by its area-based equivalent (Table 4, …rst data column), and by instrumenting
smallness and its interaction term (second data column). Our qualitative results turn out not
to be a¤ected. Point estimates on smallness and on the interaction terms of smallness with 
retain their signs but are larger in absolute value. The net e¤ect of smallness for Leviathan
municipalities remains negative, which is consistent with strong Leviathan taming. This e¤ect
is statistically signi…cant when we instrument for smallness.29
A second extension is to augment our baseline speci…cation with instrumented centraliza-
tion ratios (Table 4, third and fourth data columns). Inclusion of this variable is not warranted
by the theory, but we consider it by way of a robustness test and for comparability of our results
to those of related empirical studies. While the coe¢cients on centralization themselves are
not statistically signi…cant, the main e¤ect and the interaction e¤ect of smallness again retain
their signs. Strong Leviathan taming continues to be supported. We therefore conclude that
the centralism variable is not itself signi…cant and does not qualitatively change our results.
As a further robustness check, we estimate the baseline model using two-stage least squares,
which remains unbiased in the presence of spatial autocorrelation in  but is less e¢cient
than spatial GMM. The results are shown in Table 5. Moran’s , computed on the residuals
and reported in the bottom row of Table 5, strongly supports the presence of spatial error
dependence, validating our choice of spatial GMM as the principal estimator. As expected,
most coe¢cients are less precisely estimated with two-stage least squares than with spatial
GMM. None of our qualitative results, however, depends on the choice of estimator: point
estimates and standard errors are similar to those of our baseline regressions in Table 3 and
29When we instrument smallness with its area-based equivalent (second data column of Table 4), the …rst-
stage F statistics for the interaction term are small, suggesting weak instruments. Results for this speci…cation
therefore ought to be interpreted with some caution.
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to the additional speci…cation reported in Table 4. We again …nd evidence that is consistent
with strong Leviathan taming, which in two cases is statistically signi…cant.
Finally, we estimate the baseline model separately for the nine representative tax bases that
underlie the construction of our tax indices. Although most municipalities decide on a single
multiplier that shifts tax schedules symmetrically for all tax bases, it might be interesting to
specify the regressions as if the municipal choices were independent across tax bases. Table
6 reports the main and interaction e¤ects of smallness and  for the assembly and referen-
dum de…nitions of  respectively. We continue to …nd satisfactory statistics on overidentifying
restrictions, but …rst-stage  tests suggest weak instrument problems for a majority of re-
gression runs. The estimated coe¢cients for the three representative personal income taxes
(which, we recall, account for about 70% of municipal tax revenues) are qualitatively similar.
They all suggest that vertical externalities dominate the tax choices of municipalities governed
by citizens’ assemblies, implying ine¢ciently high tax rates of relatively small municipalities,
while the remaining (Leviathan) municipalities see their tax rates reduced by smallness, sug-
gesting a salutary e¤ect of tax competition in their case. In …ve out of the six regression runs
concerning tax rates on personal income, we …nd statistically signi…cant evidence of strong
Leviathan taming, the sum of the coe¢cients on smallness and *smallness being statistically
signi…cantly negative. Interestingly, the most important of all the representative tax bases
(married household with median income) provides the strongest evidence of strong Leviathan
taming, with all three relevant coe¢cients having the appropriate signs as well as being statis-
tically signi…cant ( statistics on main and interaction e¤ects of Smallness, and Wald statistic
on the sum of the main + interaction e¤ects of smallness).
5 Conclusions
We …nd that, relative to a benchmark sample, Swiss municipalities which delegate …scal au-
thority to elected executives on average set lower taxes the smaller their share of their canton’s
population. In a sense, this mirrors the result found in a number of previous “Oates regres-
sions”, whereby jurisdictional fragmentation is associated with lower tax rates. Traditionally,
it has been di¢cult to read a clear interpretation into these results, because a negative partial
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correlation between fragmentation and tax rates could represent either (second-best e¢cient)
Leviathan taming via horizontal tax competition, or a race to the bottom away from the so-
cially optimal tax rates. We argue that, in our case, this ambiguity can be overcome, and
our …nding can be interpreted as evidence of welfare-enhancing Leviathan taming through tax
competition.
A key novelty of our approach is that we can enlist extraneous information on the pref-
erences of municipal decision makers in a federal setting. A sizeable subsample of Swiss
municipalities set tax rates by direct democratic participation of the citizenry. Arguably, their
executives are more constrained to behave “benevolently”. We take these as the benchmark
municipalities, and we …nd that, for them, the basic relationship between relative “smallness”
and average tax rates is positive: the smaller they are, the higher their tax rates. This is con-
sistent with dominant vertical externalities in a model of tax competition among benevolent
jurisdictions in federal systems.
Most importantly, we …nd that, other things equal, the relationship between fragmentation
and tax rates turns negative (or at least not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero) for the munici-
palities with delegated …scal authority. Hence, we can infer that tax rates fall (or at least do
not rise) in fragmentation because these municipalities o¤er some scope for Leviathan govern-
ment behavior. According to the theory, tax-rate reducing competition among jurisdictions
with some degree of Leviathan government preferences is welfare improving if, all else equal,
competition among more benevolent jurisdictions would have raised equilibrium tax rates. We
therefore interpret our …ndings not only as evidence of Leviathan taming via jurisdictional
fragmentation but also as a manifestation of welfare-enhancing tax competition.
The ‡ip side of this result, of course, is that the signi…cant impact of fragmentation on
the taxes of direct-democratic municipalities suggests welfare-reducing distortions from (ver-
tical) tax externalities. Our results therefore imply that tax competition via jurisdictional
fragmentation is bene…cial only to the extent that governments are Leviathans. Coordinated
tax setting by benevolent governments remains the …rst-best policy.
How general are our …ndings? In terms of research methodology, our approach should lend
itself to replication in alternative data sets. Although the extent of sub-national institutional
diversity observed in Switzerland may well be unique in the world, this study could potentially
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be carried out for other countries. Romer and Rosenthal (1982), and Farnham (1990), for
example, have exploited di¤erences in the availability of citizens’ initiatives at the level of
US communities in a study of local expenditure levels. As an alternative, one might use the
closeness of local election results as an inverse proxy for the latitude local politicians enjoy
to make decisions that diverge from the median voter’s preferences. Such an approach …nds
support in the results found by Besley and Case (2003), whereby stronger party competition in
US state legislatures yield lower tax burdens; and in those obtained by List and Sturm (2006),
according to which more narrowly elected state governors try harder to satisfy the preferences
(in terms of environmental spending) of their electorate.
There are some evident limits to the generality of our study. By adopting a representative-
agent framework with a single tax base, our analysis has abstracted from welfare e¤ects arising
through Tiebout sorting, through policy interactions concerning multiple tax bases, or through
expenditure-side ine¢ciencies such as waste induced by red tape in large centralized bureau-
cracies.30 Moreover, explicit consideration of horizontal and vertical …scal transfers might be
warranted in alternative empirical settings. Finally, it will be interesting to study empirically
the implications for tax competition of di¤erent forms of indirect democracy.31 We leave these
extensions for future work.
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A Appendix: A model of taxation in a …scal federation
A.1 Basic structure
Consider a federation with  ¸ 1 states. Each state  is populated by  investor-…rms.32
Hence, the federation’s total population is given by

=1
 =  . Investor-…rms determine
the within-federation, per-…rm supply () and demand () of a perfectly mobile production
factor.33 Firms use an identical concave production technology  (), with  0  0 and
 00 =   0, implying that the slope of the demand for capital does not depend on the tax
rate. The net-of-tax rate of return  of the factor is determined in a federation-wide capital
market. The factor is taxed by federal and state governments at rates  and  respectively,
with   =  +  . We denote the vector of state tax rates by t, with elements  . The vector
of equilibrium state tax rates is denoted by t¤.
Pro…t maximization determines per-…rm capital demand  =  (+  ), with  0 = 1.
State ’s aggregate capital demand is simply  . Rent, de…ned as the di¤erence between
the value of production and the rental cost of capital,  =  (), is distributed to the resident
investors.
Each investor is endowed with  units of , of which  is invested within the federation
and the remainder is invested in the rest of the world (ROW).34 Without loss of generality,
returns in the ROW are normalized to zero. This implies that  can take negative values if
the rate of return is lower in the federation than in the ROW.
Preferences over private goods are given by
  = (¡ ) +  +  ((1 + ))  (3)
where  (¢) is an increasing and concave function, implying a “home bias” in investment.
Domestic and foreign incomes being considered as imperfect substitutes, di¤erences in the rate
of return between the federation and the ROW can exist even with perfect capital mobility.
The investment decision implies per-investor capital supply  =  (), which turns out to
be identical across states. Capital supply from state  is thus given by . For analytical
convenience, we assume that inward investment from outside the federation is zero.35 Market
clearing implies that  () =  (+  ) and determines the equilibrium rate of
return in the federation. The e¤ect on the rate of return of a change in state ’s tax rate is
(using  0 = 1)


=
 0

 (0 ¡ 0) = 
 0
(0 ¡ 0)  0 (4)
where  =

 is the population share of state . Similarly, the e¤ect on  of a change in
the tax rates of all states is
0 ´ 
t
=

 0

 (0 ¡ 0) =
 0
(0 ¡ 0) 2 [¡1 0)
Hence,  = 
0. This implies that the change in the net-of-tax rate of return with respect
32We will use the terms “investor” and “…rm” interchangeably.
33 can represent any mobile production factor that might be taxed by governments, e.g. labor. For simplicity
we denote it as “capital”.
34 In the interpretation of  as labor,  represents endowments of time which can be “invested” in the labor
market. Note that one might equivalently interpret the model in terms of an intertemporal savings decision as in
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), by relabeling “investment in ROW” as …rst-period consumption and “domestic
investment” as investment for second-period consumption.
35Allowing for two-way investment ‡ows would complicate the model without changing any of our qualitative
results.
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to a change in one state’s tax rate is independent of the distribution of the federal population
among the other states (as the distribution of 6= , does not feature in  ).
Publicly provided goods are produced with constant returns and distributed equally to
all investor-…rms. No tax revenue is wasted. This implies per-capita budget constraints
 =  (+  ) for the state governments, and  = 1   (+  ) for the federal
government.
Publicly provided goods enter agents’ utility function. Total indirect utility for an investor
in state  can be written as
 = (¡ ) +  (+  ) +  ((1 + )) + ¡ ( ;)  (5)
where ¡ ( ;) is increasing and concave in both arguments.36
A.2 Government preferences and citizen welfare
The existing literature identi…es two polar cases: benevolent governments and purely revenue-
maximizing (Leviathan) governments. We assume that intermediate cases are also possible,
and that state governments, to the extent that they are benevolent, only consider the utility
of their own subjects. This is captured by the following per-capita objective function of state
governments:
- = 1 ¡   +  (+  )  (6)
which nests the two polar scenarios as well as intermediate cases.37 We allow the intensity
of Leviathan preferences  to vary among states. For  = 0, the government’s objective
function coincides with the individual utility function of the state’s residents, whereas  = 1
represents a pure Leviathan.38
State governments maximize - taking into account agents’ choices, factor-market clearing
and the budget constraints. Using (4), and the fact that 0 = ¡, we can write the …rst-order
condition, evaluated at equilibrium and implicitly determining state tax rates as
 ´ - t=t¤ = 1 ¡ 
1
(1+)
0 ¡ (0 + 1) + ¡ [ +  0 (0 + 1)]
+¡ [ 0 (0 + 1)]g +  [ +  0 (0 + 1)] = 0
 (7)
where 11+ = 
0 (see (5)).
This …rst-order condition implies
 ()
t t=t¤
=
 ()
t t=t¤
=  +  0 0 + 1 ¸ 0 (8)
Hence, at equilibrium, tax revenues increase with a symmetric rise in states’ tax rates.39
Changes in equilibrium state tax rates are therefore monotonically related to changes in tax
revenues and public spending. This implies that our empirical approach based on tax rates
36A possible functional form is  = (¡ )+ [(1 + ) ] + +  , which we use for our simulations
(see Appendix). We shall furthermore impose that +    0, allowing us to use conventional functional forms
without further transformations.
37Note that the solution to the maximization problem of - is identical to that of the aggregate objective
- , given that  is exogenous.
38Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) model the Leviathan by assuming that some exogenously given fraction of
tax revenues are used for expenditure that bene…ts only the government itself. Adopting this modeling approach
would not change our main results. Keen (1998) combines benevolent and Leviathan motives by positing the
objective function (1¡ )  (+ ) + ¡ (), where () represents the citizens’ utility from a private good
and ¡() utility from the public goods. This setup could only be applied to our analysis if federal spending 
were taken as fully exogenous, which would assume away vertical externalities.
39Expression (8) is equivalent to expression (23) in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003).
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is consistent with Oates-type speci…cations, which use tax revenues or public spending as the
endogenous variable.
Given the homogeneity of agents, social welfare is characterized by  . Analysis of the
symmetric version of this model (e.g. by Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002, 2004) has shown
that, except for knife-edge con…gurations, independent state-level tax setting leads to socially
suboptimal equilibrium state tax rates: a symmetric change in all tax rates can be welfare
improving. The equivalent in our setup is a marginal change in t. Using the fact that, for
state , the other states’ tax rates enter the welfare function only indirectly via their e¤ect on
, we can express the e¤ect of such a change as

t
=
1
(1 + )
0 ¡ 0 + 1 + ¡  +  0 0 + 1 + ¡ 0 0 + 1  (9)
For less than pure Leviathans (  1), subtracting (7) from (9) yields an expression that
lends itself to economic interpretation:

t 1
=
(1 ¡ )
70

(1 + )
¡ 0 +
0
¡ 00 +
0
¡ 0 0 + 1
¡ 1¡  +  0 0 + 1
0
? 040 (10)
The …rst set of brackets contains three terms. The …rst of these terms may be called
a tax exporting e¤ect, due to the fact that in this setting, unlike in the symmetric model,
capital supply and demand in state  are not necessarily equal. This e¤ect pushes equilibrium
tax rates above or below the social optimum, depending on whether    or   .
The second term represents the horizontal tax externality, arising from the interaction among
state governments, and driving equilibrium tax rates below the social optimum. The third term
represents the vertical tax externality, which results from the coexistence of the federal and the
state governments. This e¤ect pushes equilibrium tax rates above the social optimum. Finally,
the second brackets contain what we call the Leviathan e¤ect, representing the deviation from
optimal revenue collection induced by Leviathan government preferences. The Leviathan e¤ect
implies that the higher is  the greater is the scope for suboptimally high state tax rates.
A.3 State size
We are now in a position to study the e¤ect of a change in state size on the equilibrium state
tax rate through a simple exercise in comparative statics. State size is our (inverse) measure
of fragmentation.41 We abstract from the impact of a small change in the size of one state 
on the relative size of the other states (6= »= 0).
Let H denote the system of …rst-order conditions characterized by (7), H the Jacobian
matrix with element   equal to  and H the vector with -th element  . The expression
for the vector rt with elements  is then given by rt = ¡H¡1 ¤ H . Assuming that
state taxes are strategic complements implies that all o¤-diagonal elements of the negative
de…nite matrix H are positive. Hence all elements of its inverse are negative.42
40The corresponding expression for pure Leviathans is: t =1
=

(1 + )
¡ 0 ¡
0
+
(1¡ ) ¡00
0
+ ¡0 0 + 1
0
? 0
41The relationship between state size and fragmentation is discussed in Section 2.2.
42See, for example, Wansbeek and Meijer (2000, Theorem A18). The assumption of strategic complementarity
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Concerning the sign of  (and


), we can therefore concentrate on


= 1 ¡  (1 + ) ¡ 
0 + ¡ 00 + ¡ 0 0 + 1 +  00 (11)
This implies that the state tax rate may increase or decrease with state size. The net e¤ect
depends on
² the balance between horizontal and vertical tax externalities (with dominant horizon-
tal externalities strengthening the tendency for tax rates to rise with state size, and
vice-versa for dominant vertical externalities), which can be gleaned through the corre-
spondence of bracketed terms in (10) and (11), and
² the intensity of Leviathan preferences (with stronger Leviathan preferences strengthening
the relative importance of vertical externalities).
The relationship between state size and equilibrium tax rates is interesting in itself and can
be measured empirically. However, we ultimately strive for statements about welfare e¤ects
of tax competition. This requires that we can establish a link between, on the one hand, the
observable relationship between state size and the equilibrium tax rate (the “tax rate e¤ect of
size”), and, on the other hand, the unobservable relationship between state size, the tax rate
and welfare (the “welfare e¤ect of size”). Since relative state size serves as an inverse measure
for the intensity of tax competition, the welfare e¤ect of size can be interpreted as an inverse
measure of the desirability of tax competition.43
The utility function (5) implies that welfare is not a¤ected by  directly but indirectly via
the e¤ect of  on  . If we abstract from the determination of  by assuming that the federal
tax rate is independent of the distribution of investor-…rms across states, the welfare e¤ect of
a change in state ’s size can then be written as


=

t



 (12)
Thus, the welfare e¤ect of size is the product of (a) the derivative of state welfare relative
to the vector of state tax rates and (b) the tax rate e¤ect of size, summed across all states of
the federation.
It is not possible to derive a general analytical solution for the tax rate e¤ect of size,
and hence for the welfare e¤ect of size. As a …rst stepping stone towards overcoming the
impossibility of a general mapping from tax to welfare e¤ects, we can formally derive one
speci…c but ultimately very helpful result:
Proposition 1 Suppose   0. Then

t  0 and


 0.
If   0, then (10) and (11) imply that

(1+) ¡ 0 + ¡ 00 + ¡ 0 (0 + 1) 
0, and the proposition follows.
Proposition 1 is a stepping stone towards a unique mapping from the tax rate e¤ect of size
to the welfare e¤ect of size, for the speci…c case where we compare jurisdictions of which some
have higher  ’s than others, and where the tax rate e¤ect of size for the lower- jurisdictions
is negative (i.e. Proposition 1 holds for the more benevolent states). As can be easily gleaned
from expression (12), the relationship between the welfare e¤ect of size and the tax rate e¤ect
of size in state  hinges on the derivative of state- welfare with respect to the vector of state-
is supported by a large empirical literature on tax reaction functions (see Brueckner, 2003, for a survey). Note
that strategic complementarity is a su¢cient, but not necessary, condition for H¡1 to be negative.
43Note that our results, focusing on the change in welfare induced by a change in state size, is not inconsistent
with the …nding that, with horizontal tax competition and a given distribution of state sizes, smaller states
obtain a higher level of welfare in equilibrium than larger states (see e.g. Bucovetsky, 1991).
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tax rates (t ). If the sign of this derivative can be established, the sign of the relationship
between the welfare e¤ect of size and the tax rate e¤ect of size is also determinate. Extensive
simulations show that this is indeed possible for the precise scenario sketched above.
Speci…cally, we track the sign of t as  changes, for a large number of parameter combi-
nations and with di¤erent starting values of  (details are given in Appendix B). We constrain
the domain of investigation by considering only cases that are compatible with Proposition
1, i.e. where t 
 0, with  denoting the starting value. In other words, we explore
how state governments’ becoming less benevolent a¤ects t if taxes are too high initially.
Table A2 shows that t 
 0 without exception for all parameter con…gurations that
yield a solution: if the initial state tax rate is too high and the state government becomes less
benevolent, the state tax rate will remain too high.44
If at  the tax rate e¤ect of size is negative (i.e.


 0) then we know from Proposition
1 that t must be negative too. Since, for a given  , higher  implies upward pressure on
 ,

t will then be also be negative for all    , ceteris paribus. If we thus were to observe
that, at some higher value of  the tax rate e¤ect of size turns positive, this will imply a
negative welfare e¤ect of size: tax competition will then be good for citizen welfare.
We can summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose Proposition 1 holds for  = . Then

t 
 0. Thus,

 =
 0 implies that  =
 0.
Hence, if the vertical tax externality dominates in a state under relatively benevolent
government, then if a decrease in this state’s size under a less benevolent government will
lower equilibrium tax rates this decrease in state size increases welfare: tax competition is
welfare improving.
A corollary of Proposition 2 is that, as long as t  0 at some interior value of  , there
exists a pivotal level ¤ , determined by setting (11) equal to 0, above which the welfare e¤ect
of state size turns negative (i.e. tax competition becomes welfare improving). This pivotal
level is given by:
¤ =

(1+) ¡ 0 + ¡ 00 + ¡ 0 (0 + 1)

(1+) ¡ 0 + ¡ 00 + ¡ 0 (0 + 1) ¡  00

Both the numerator and the denominator of this ratio are negative, such that ¤ 2 [0 1]. ¤
is low, and the scope for Leviathan-taming tax competition is large, when vertical externalities
dominate horizontal externalities only relatively weakly.
In sum, if comparing two states that di¤er only in terms of their s, we observe that

 =
 0 and  =
 0, then this implies that   ¤   , i.e. the two
observed states with di¤erent levels of  are on either side of the critical value, with the
welfare consequences outlined in Proposition 2.
B Appendix: Simulations
Some aspects of our model are not analytically tractable. Therefore, we perform a series of
simulations.
44Table A3 shows that the reverse result holds too: if the inital state tax rate is too low, and the state
government becomes more benevolent, the state tax rate will remain too low.
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Functional forms must be compatible with the assumptions made in the model. The
production function used is
 () =  ¡ 2
2
 
Pro…t maximization determines capital demand  =  (¡ (+  )), its slope  0 = ¡
and the rent function  = 12
2
 . We adopt
 = (¡ ) + [(1 + )] +  + 
as the expression for aggregate indirect utility, which in turn determines the capital sup-
ply (  ), and, using capital demand, 0.45 Introducing the state government’s objective
function, using the budget constraints, we obtain
- = 1 ¡  (¡ ) + [(1 + )] + 
+()  

+  fg 
with the corresponding …rst-order condition  .
The simulation exercise allows us to investigate whether the equilibrium tax rate can indeed
be too high or too low (t 7 0) for any value of  . Furthermore, Proposition 2 is based on
simulation results, which uses the expressions obtained for t for di¤erent values of  .
We perform a grid search across a range of parameter values (using Maple). The model
parameters are  , , , , , ,  and  . We work with a total of three states,  = 1 2 3,
assuming that 2 = 13 , 1 2 (005 015 025) and 3 = 1 ¡ 1 ¡ 2. Additionally, we simulate
all possible permutations for three di¤erent and evenly spaced values of all the parameters
except  . This implies a total of 6,561 runs per simulation. Then we repeat the simulation
for four values of  2 0 13  23  1 .
The program solves, in each run, for the equilibrium values of the state tax rates  and
the rate of return in the federation , and it then evaluates  (and  ,  and

 ) at this
solution.
For the parameters  and  we take 1 as the starting value and add increments of 1;
whereas  takes on the values 0.05, 0.15, 0.25. The production function parameter  is set to
0.5, 1 and 1.5. For the parameters ,  and , which range between zero and one, the program
starts at 0.3 with two increments of 0.3. We impose  = 0 as the starting value for the solution
algorithm. This may be considered a natural starting point, as it implies that the federation
rate of return equals that in the rest of the world. Some parameter combinations yield no
solutions. Inspection of those cases shows that this occurs when the exogenous parameters
are incompatible (high  and low  ). Furthermore, some solutions imply equilibrium state
tax rate outside the plausible interval [0,1]. Since, these solutions correspond only to a small
subset and (more importantly) conform with the patterns found for the plausible solutions,
we do not report them separately.
Table A1 presents a basic description of the simulation results, while Tables A2 and A3
report the results leading to Proposition 2. For space reasons we present the results for state
1 only. Table A2 is key: if state tax rates are initially too high, they remain too high when 
increases, without exception.
45Note that in this speci…cation  = 0.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev.
Mun. or cant.
with min.
Mun. or cant.
with max.
Municipality-level variables
Tax index 635 0.00 0.84 Freienbach (SZ) Porrentruy (JU)
Tax index ( = 0) 370 0.12 0.83 Freienbach (SZ) Porrentruy (JU)
Tax index ( = 1) 265 -0.18 0.82 Carouge (GE) La Chaux-de-Fonds (NE)
 650 0.42 0.49 (several) (several)
Smallness 650 0.93 0.11 Basel (BS) Nidau (BE)
Population 650 23,570 39,180 Appenzell (AI) Zürich (ZH)
Share of pop. under 20 650 0.16 0.04 Lugano (TI) Einsiedeln (SZ)
Share of pop. over 65 650 0.19 0.03 Volketswil (ZH) Riehen (BS)
Area (hectares) 650 1,945 2,608 Nidau (BE) Davos (GR)
Urban center dummy 650 0.41 0.49 (several) (several)
Distance to freeway (km) 650 4.04 6.68 Morges (VD) St. Moritz (GR)
Distance to airport (km) 650 48.48 38.06 (several) St. Moritz (GR)
Lake shore (meters) 650 2,173 4,490 (several) Einsiedeln (SZ)
Canton-level variables
Tax index 650 0.00 0.87 Schwyz Geneva
Latin dummy 650 0.27 0.44 (several) (several)
Harmonized-tax dummy 650 0.22 0.41 (several) (several)
Urbanized population 650 412,345 355,027 (several) Zürich
Area (hectares) 650 220,772 192,636 Basel Stadt Graubünden
Number of municipalities 650 177.50 126.74 Basel Stadt Berne
Table 1: Summary statistics
Tax index of log tax rates. Government objectives () according to referendum de…nition.
Variable Obs. Mean Std.dev.
Mun. or cant.
with min.
Mun. or cant.
with max.
Personal income tax rate
single, median inc. 650 4.13 1.10 Freienbach (SZ) Le Locle (NE)
married, median inc. 650 3.53 1.18 Freienbach (SZ) Le Locle (NE)
married, high inc. 650 10.52 2.33 Freienbach (SZ) Amriswil (TG)
Personal wealth tax rate
wealth = CHF200,000 640 0.11 0.07 Baar, Zug (ZG) Glarus (GL)
wealth = CHF5,000,000 640 0.31 0.06 Freienbach (SZ) Solothurn (SO)
Corporate income tax rate
2% pro…tability 635 3.62 1.50 Herisau (AR) (several)
9% pro…tability 635 5.14 1.75 Freienbach (SZ) Porrentruy (JU)
32% pro…tability 635 7.58 2.72 Freienbach (SZ) Solothurn (SO)
Corp. capital tax rate 635 0.22 0.11 Zug (ZG) Glarus (GL)
Table 2: Tax rates
Tax rates in percent. Municipalities in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden and Basel Stadt do not levy
corporate taxes; municipalities in the canton of Basel do not levy personal wealth taxes.
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dependent var. = log municipal tax index Referendum de…nition Assembly de…nition
Smallness (main e¤ect) 166
(018)
108
550¤¤¤
(045)
185
Leviathan dummy ( main e¤ect) 037¤¤
(022)
018
091¤¤¤
(059)
027
*Smallness (interaction e¤ect) ¡295¤¤
(¡021)
118
¡719¤¤
(¡042)
309
Cantonal tax index ( , instrumented) 033
(034)
020
037¤¤
(034)
018
Neighbors’ avg. tax index (¡ , instrumented) 079¤
(025)
042
043
(007)
090
Population of municipality ¡005
(004)
011
¡037¤
(¡028)
019
Share of mun. pop. under 20 028
(008)
026
023
(007)
022
Share of mun. pop. over 65 024
(005)
031
010
(002)
040
Area of municipality 010
(010)
007
030¤¤¤
(031)
009
Urban center dummy 025¤¤
(015)
013
051¤¤¤
(033)
019
Distance to freeway ¡006
(¡007)
005
¡001
(¡001)
008
Distance to airport 024¤¤¤
(029)
009
032¤¤
(044)
013
Lake shore ¡003¤¤¤
(¡016)
001
¡003¤¤¤
(¡018)
001
Latin dummy ¡053¤
(¡029)
028
¡143¤¤¤
(¡063)
033
Harmonized-tax dummy ¡029¤
(¡014)
016
018
(009)
014
Number of observations 635 310
Wald 2: Smallness main + interaction = 0 207
015
070
040
Wald 2: ¯ = 0 33729
000
59226
000
Hansen  statistic 565
058
772
036
1st-stage instr.  statistic, Cantonal tax 1545 4881
1st-stage instr.  statistic, Neighbors’ tax 2709 2186
Table 3: Baseline tax index regressions (spatial GMM)
Beta coe¢cients in parentheses, standard errors below. *** signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
Two-tail P values below 2 and J statistics. Regressions include intercept and dummies for Geneva and
Basel-Land. All variables mean-di¤erenced by year; non-dichotomous variables in natural logs. Cantonal tax
indices and neighboring municipal tax indices instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus canton urban
population, canton area, canton number of municipalities and weighted averages of municipal variables as
instruments. First-stage F statistics robust to spatial autocorrelation.
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dep. var. = log munic. tax index
Smallness
in terms
of area
Smallness
instrumented
Control for
centralism
Control for
centralism,
Smallness
instrumented
Smallness (main e¤ect) 474
387
212
135
144
156
292
225
Leviathan dummy (, main e¤.) 044
021
¤¤ 037¤
019
035¤
019
038¤¤
018
*Smallness (interaction) ¡973
762
¡419¤¤¤
152
¡274¤
152
¡537¤¤
220
Cantonal tax index ( , instrum.) 034
019
¤ 028
019
036
028
018
032
Neighbors’ avg. tax index
(¡ , instrumented) 059048 070
¤
042
076¤
045
069¤
041
Centralization ratio (instrum.) (n.a.) (n.a.) ¡012
075
026
104
Population of municipality ¡008
011
¡009
010
¡006
013
¡008
013
Share of mun. pop. under 20 029
029
017
028
028
026
013
030
Share of mun. pop. over 65 025
033
023
031
023
033
025
031
Area of municipality 012
010
012
008
010
007
012
008
Urban center dummy 023¤
012
024¤
013
025¤
013
021¤
012
Distance to freeway ¡006
005
¡008
005
¡007
005
¡008¤
005
Distance to airport 026¤¤¤
009
025¤¤¤
009
024¤¤¤
009
025¤¤¤
009
Lake shore ¡003¤¤
001
¡004¤¤¤
001
¡003¤¤
001
¡004¤¤
002
Latin dummy ¡056¤¤
028
¡048
028
¤ ¡053¤
028
¡046¤
027
Harmonized-tax dummy ¡025
017
¡032
016
¤¤ ¡027
019
¡038
024
Wald 2: Smalln. main + int’n = 0 050
048
300
008
209
015
393
005
Wald 2 ( ): ¯ = 0 33240
000
33424
000
33608
000
33542
000
Hansen  statistic 670
046
532
062
543
061
587
056
1st-stage  stat., Cant. tax 1722 2249 1545 2249
1st-stage  stat., Mun. tax 2570 2548 2709 2548
1st-stage  stat., Centr. ratio (n.a.) (n.a.) 1803 1734
1st-stage  stat., Smalln. main e¤. (n.a.) 1173 (n.a.) 1173
1st-stage  stat., Smalln. int’n. (n.a.) 221 (n.a.) 221
Table 4: Alternative tax index regressions (spatial GMM)
All regressions based on referendum de…nition (635 observations). Standard errors below coe¢cients. ***
signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Two-tail P values below 2 and J statistics. Regressions include
intercept and dummies for Geneva and Basel-Land. All variables mean-di¤erenced by year; non-dichotomous
variables in natural logs. Instrument sets include variables listed in notes to Table 3, plus area-based
smallness. Spatial GMM …rst-stage F statistics robust to spatial autocorrelation.
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dep. var. = log munic. tax index Baselineregression
Smallness
instrumented
Control for
centralism
Control for
centralism
Smallness (main e¤ect) 180¤
100
185
129
225
154
228
296
Leviathan dummy (, main e¤.) 016
016
023
017
017
016
022
017
*Smallness (interaction) ¡247¤¤
115
¡431¤¤
167
¡277¤
154
¡465
317
Cantonal tax index ( , instrum.) 017
018
020
019
009
027
013
039
Neighbors’ avg. tax index
(¡ , instrumented) 053034 053034 057036 057040
Centralization ratio (instrum.) (n.a.) (n.a.) 037
095
021
139
Population of municipality 001
011
¡010
012
005
013
¡007
015
Share of mun. pop. under 20 013
027
013
030
012
027
010
032
Share of mun. pop. over 65 023
033
017
033
029
036
023
040
Area of municipality 008
008
008
008
008
008
008
008
Urban center dummy 020
014
019
014
018
015
018
015
Distance to freeway ¡007
005
¡009
005
¡006
006
¡009
005
Distance to airport 028¤¤¤
009
028¤¤¤
010
028¤¤¤
009
028¤¤¤
010
Lake shore ¡004¤¤¤
001
¡004¤¤¤
001
¡004¤¤¤
001
¡004¤¤
002
Latin dummy ¡031
027
¡038
028
¡034
029
¡037
028
Harmonized-tax dummy ¡027¤
015
¡029
016
¤ ¡031¤
017
¡032
024
Wald 2: Smalln. main + int’n = 0 069
041
274
009
038
053
282
009
2 059 059 057 057
Hansen  statistic 785
035
704
043
746
028
648
037
1st-stage  stat., Cant. tax 8130 7598 8130 7598
1st-stage  stat., Mun. tax 11087 9455 11087 9455
1st-stage  stat., Centr. ratio (n.a.) (n.a.) 6933 7231
1st-stage  stat., Smalln. main e¤. (n.a.) 11528 (n.a.) 11528
1st-stage  stat., Smalln. int’n. (n.a.) 4352 (n.a.) 4352
Moran’s  (spatial autocorr.) 028
000
025
000
027
000
024
000
Table 5: Alternative tax index regressions (2-Stage Least Squares)
All regressions based on referendum de…nition (635 observations). Standard errors below coe¢cients. ***
signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. Two-tail P values below 2 and J statistics. Regressions include
intercept and dummies for Geneva and Basel-Land. All variables mean-di¤erenced by year; non-dichotomous
variables in natural logs. Instrument sets include variables listed in notes to Table 3, plus area-based
Smallness. Standard errors and …rst-stage F statistics based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors,
clustered by municipality. Moran’s I based on 15 km distance bands, P value below.
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dep. var. =
log tax rate on... Smallness  *Smallness
# of
obs.
Wald
2  stat.
 stat.

 stat.
¡
Referendum de…nition
Personal Income
single
median. inc. 036
¤
020
005
006
¡058
020
650 1036
000
393
079
1011 79353
married
median inc. 044
¤¤¤
017
007
006
¡069¤¤¤
017
650 1213
000
531
062
698 54969
married
high inc. 079073
005
007
¡087
072
650 200
016
679
045
883 2 01295
Wealth
200k ¡117
073
008
010
¡032
095
640 303
008
696
043
480 37624
5m 038¤
021
003
004
¡012
024
640 219
014
492
067
1354 57455
Corporate Income
2% pro…t ¡037
046
¡002
010
072
052
635 096
032
915
024
867 5090
9% pro…t ¡088¤
050
012
009
094
058
635 004
084
966
021
987 5278
32% pro…t 017
041
026¤¤¤
006
¡033
047
635 028
060
1139
012
662 10872
Capital ¡222¤¤¤
061
006
007
126¤
072
635 414
004
1138
012
1381 11077
Assembly de…nition
Personal Income
single
median inc. 080
¤¤
033
018¤¤¤
004
¡103¤¤¤
037
325 1247
000
816
031
1595 3 78034
married
median inc. 066
¤
036
015¤¤¤
005
¡081¤¤
038
325 376
005
599
054
1378 1 51234
married
high inc. 224
¤¤
090
031¤¤¤
008
¡249¤¤¤
095
325 1188
000
821
031
2096 9 62286
Wealth
200k ¡053
134
019
044
001
563
315 001
092
295
089
496 30003
5m 104¤¤¤
032
020¤¤¤
007
¡158¤¤¤
053
315 126
026
709
042
1695 91897
Corporate Income
2% pro…t 014
069
020¤
011
¡031
120
310 005
082
519
064
680 51610
9% pro…t 096¤
057
023¤¤¤
007
¡067
079
310 047
050
560
059
750 1 04438
32% pro…t 181¤¤¤
050
029¤¤¤
009
¡149¤
090
310 034
056
302
088
675 64070
Capital ¡095
186
017
020
050
225
310 006
080
257
092
818 41740
Table 6: Regressions for individual tax instruments (spatial GMM)
Standard errors below coe¢cients. *** signi…cant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 2 statistics of Wald test of
H0: Smallness main + interaction = 0; two-tail P values below. Non-reported controls are identical to Table
3; except harmonized-tax dummy, which is not included for personal taxes. Cantonal tax indices (T ) and
other municipal tax indices (t) instrumented using all exogenous regressors plus identifying instruments (see
notes to Table 3). First-stage F statistics robust to spatial autocorrelation.
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Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too high)
Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too low)
no solution
0 3,111 3,370 80
1
3 5,624 922 15
2
3 6,361 200 0
1 6,445 116 0
Sum 21,541(82.1% )
4,608
(17.6% )
95
(0.1% )
¢
Runs with
¢
¢  0
(Leviathan has lower taxes)
Runs with
¢
¢  0
(Leviathan has higher taxes)
No solution
0-13 0 6,481 80
1
3 -
2
3 0 6,546 15
2
3 -1 1,218 5,343 0
Sum 1,218(6.2% )
18,370
(93.3% )
95
(0.5% )
Table A1: Basic simulation results
Simulations are described in Appendix B. Each simulation run covers 6,561 di¤erent parameter con…gurations.
Some solutions imply equilibrium state tax rates outside [0,1].
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Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too high)
Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too low)
0 3,111 n.a.
1
3 3,111 0
2
3 3,111 0
1 3,111 0
1
3 5,624 n.a.
2
3 5,624 0
1 5,624 0
2
3 6,361 n.a.
1 6,361 0
Table A2: Simulation results: reducing government benevolence when taxes are
initially too high
Simulations are described in Appendix B. Only runs where

t 
 0 are considered. Some solutions imply
equilibrium tax rates outside [0,1].

Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too high)
Runs with

1

 0
(state taxes too low)
1 n.a. 116
2
3 0 116
1
3 0 116
0 0 116
2
3 n.a. 200
1
3 0 200
0 0 200
1
3 n.a. 922
0 0 922
Table A3: Simulation results: increasing government benevolence when taxes are
initially too low
Simulations are described in Appendix B. Only runs where

t 
 0 are considered. Some solutions imply
equilibrium tax rates outside [0,1].
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